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Computing opportunity costs of growing local varieties for on-farm conservation: 
illustrations using sorghum data from Ethiopia 
1. Introduction 
The success of Ethiopian agriculture is closely related to the potential of crop varieties to 
perform in marginal areas and under stress conditions.  The crop genetic resources 
(CGRs)
2 that the country is endowed with possess various useful attributes suited to low-
input agriculture (Worede, 1997).  They  are  the  building blocks for  sustainable 
agricultural development for their role not only as inputs for variety development but also 
as indigenous crop insurance mechanisms (Wale, 2004; Wale et.al, 2005). Despite having 
such importance, loss of genetic resources is recognized as one of the major problems in 
the country (FDRE, 1998). 
To deal with this problem, on-farm conservation (a subset of in-situ conservation) has 
recently attracted considerable attention by various public stakeholders.  Its capacity to 
conserve not only the genetic resources but also the indigenous knowledge and  its 
dynamic features are among the desirable attributes of this strategy for this huge interest. 
More over, on-farm conservation offers a unique opportunity to engage local 
organizations for the implementation of community-based conservation strategy (Mburu 
and Wale, 2006).  However, due to lack of working  principles  to  implement on-farm 
conservation, it is not unusual to find conflicting recommendations (Wood and Lenne, 
1997). 
                                                   
2 CGRs in this paper refer to farmers’ varieties (hereafter FVs) which have evolved on farmers’ fields 
during the course of their farming experience.  
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Despite the importance farmers’ contribution  in maintaining agro-biodiversity for 
decades  (Teshome et. al, 1999,  Worede, 1997),  their  on-farm conservation cannot be 
expected to maintain all aspects of crop diversity because of the impure public goods 
nature of crop genetic resources (Wale, 2004). How can policy deal with this problem so 
that farmers can maintain the required level of crop diversity? 
To deal with this problem, few years ago, Ethiopia’s Institute of Biodiversity Conservation 
signed  agreements with farmers to the effect that they would conserve specific crop 
varieties and the Institute would compensate
3 them for the yield loss compared with the 
yield from improved variety (ies) (hereafter  IVs)  (Demissie and Arega, 2000). 
Compensation was then paid based on yield differences. This approach, however, has 
many problems. The Institute was using an incentive scheme that depends on the yields 
harvested i.e. if a farmer gets higher yield from the varieties maintained on-farm, he/she 
will  ultimately get  lower compensation. This clearly creates a moral hazard problem 
because farmers will not have incentive to productively use the targeted varieties as good 
yield means less compensation. Moreover, considering only yield differences in quantity 
terms without considering input levels and prices will either over- or under-estimate the 
opportunity costs
4.  
                                                   
3The idea of compensating farmers may be politically controversial in the policy circle. However, if the 
government is prepared to pay the opportunity cost of conserving crop diversity at the national level, there 
is no reason why targeted farmers should not be compensated for their contribution based on what they are 
sacrificing. Expecting farmers to maintain varieties of policy interest without compensating them the loss is 
forcing them to cooperate with policy without their will. This, clearly, does not work. 
4  Any loss (which can be monetary or non-monetary) faced by farmers when they change their variety 
choice behavior (for policy reason) is what we call the opportunity cost of changing variety use.  
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To handle such  practical problems, this paper argues that the level of compensation 
should be decided ex ante and it should be a function of the opportunity cost. To generate 
information for this purpose, it has got the following objectives: 
•  To quantify and estimate the opportunity costs of maintaining local varieties of 
sorghum; and  
•  To understand the contextual factors affecting the magnitude of the opportunity 
costs in Ethiopia and derive implications for the design of on-farm conservation 
schemes. 
2. Estimation of opportunity costs of on-farm conservation 
The choice and use of any variety, be it local or modern, involves trade-offs and 
opportunity costs (Wale et. al, 2005). While choosing certain variety (ies) to meet certain 
objective (s), a farmer loses other important traits from the set of varieties not selected. 
Considering the gross margin (hereafter GM) from the improved seeds as the next best 
alternative use of farmers’ sorghum  land and correcting for self-selection  problem 
(Heckman, 1979), the financial opportunity cost can be computed as: 
OPPORTUNITY COST = (IVGMPH - FVGMPH)                                                           (1)  
where IVGMPH and FVGMPH refer to GM per hectare (in Birr
5) of the IVs and FVs, 
respectively.  Computing  the  opportunity cost will serve as an input in the design of 
incentives for on-farm conservation because the bargaining power of the farm households 
is mainly a function of the opportunity costs they face. 
                                                   
5 Birr is the Ethiopian local currency.  
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The GMs of the improved and local varieties is computed as the gross revenue from the 
respective crops minus costs of variable inputs (seeds, fertilizer, labor used for different 
cultural practices – land preparation, sowing, cultivation, weeding and harvesting, 
bullock labor, chemicals and bird scaring). 
The magnitude of the opportunity cost depends on the suitability of farmers’ environment 
to the production and marketing of local and improved seeds. In theory, the factors 
determining the suitability include access variables (markets and extension); level of 
input use (fertilizer, chemicals and oxen); resource endowment (education, labor and cash 
crop farming); experience in growing improved seeds and natural factors (plot quality 
and rainfall). The more favorable these conditions are to the production and marketing of 
the improved seeds compared to local seeds, the higher the magnitude of the opportunity 
cost.  Accordingly, inputs and local conditions affecting both varieties equally do not 
affect opportunity costs. 
How can we use opportunity costs to design incentives for on-farm conservation? The 
incentives theory literature suggests that many incentive schemes are by and large based 
on cost data (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). To serve the purpose envisaged, the incentive 
scheme should be  strong enough to encourage farmers to exert the effort required to 
attain the conservation objective. Since the opportunity cost reflects the loss farmers face, 
compensating farmers based on opportunity costs would mean fulfilling farmers’ 
expectations. While estimating opportunity costs gives an indication of the magnitude of 
the competition, analysis on the factors affecting opportunity costs can guide the choice 
of farmers to be targeted and inform on the determinants of the size of the incentive.  
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Despite their huge role in national conservation policy making (Wale, 2004), studies on 
opportunity costs (to the farmers) of crop genetic resources conservation are almost non-
existent. The empirical results of this paper are meant to solve the problem of information 
asymmetry (between farmers and policy makers) and reveal  to policy makers what 
happens to the welfare of the farmers when on-farm conservation is in place.  
3. Theoretical motivations of the econometric models 
Obviously, the GM difference cannot be attributed to the use of improved seeds per se. 
There are other household and environment related factors that affect the GM outcomes 
from using improved or local varieties. However, these factors are not randomly 
distributed among users of IVs (hereafter UIVs) and users of FVs (hereafter UFVs).  
Due to non-random distribution of the non-variety observable factors and unobserved 
variables, there is selection bias (Heckman, 1979). For the selection on the observables, 
better educated farmers, better quality land and better farm management practices could 
be skewed towards the UIVs. Regarding selection on the un-observables, the essence of 
the problem is that UIVs and UFVs are not the same with respect to variables relegated to 
the error term (Huang et. al, 1991). 
Splitting the data-set into two, a simple Chow test was run to test whether coefficients 
differ across by variety use status. The test rejects the hypothesis that the two regressions 
are the same and this supports the use of a heterogeneous treatment effects model. For the 
purpose of this paper, a switching regression model, one of the heterogeneous treatment 
effects models which can be used to deal with the selection bias (Freeman et.al, 1998) is 
used. To estimate the average opportunity costs, different homogeneous treatment effects 
statistical models are used.  
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4. The methods of data analysis 
To see the sensitivity of the estimation results to the choice of the method, the paper uses 
a variety of econometric methods to estimate average opportunity costs.  
4.1. Matching 
Matching is an evaluation method based on the intuitively appealing idea of contrasting 
the outcomes of UIVs (denoted y1) with the outcomes of ‘comparable’ UFVs (denoted y0) 
so that the differences (D = y1 - y0) in outcomes between the two groups can be attributed 
to  the  use of improved seeds. In this sense, matching is selection on the observables 
which puts the farmers of the two groups on the same footing and aims to make them the 
same except by the type of variety (local versus improved) used. It is a technique that 
attempts to draw a similar ‘partner’ for each UIVs from the group of UFVs so that the 
gross margin difference (given in equation 1) can be attributed to the use of improved 
seeds. Using logit or probit models in the first step, matching uses the predicted value of 
the first step estimation for finding a counterpart for each farmer using improved seeds 
from among those farmers using local varieties (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
4.2. Instrumental variable and treatment regression models 
Before running 2-stage least squares (2SLS), we have tested the endogeneity of one 
suspected variable: ‘impexep’  (experience in growing IVs in  years).  It is found that 
endogeneity does not exist for this variable. 
Unlike the instrumental variable regression which estimates linear probability model in 
the first stage (Baltagi, 1999), the treatment regression considers the improved variety use 
dummy (zj) as dichotomous by fitting a probit equation model. The reason to use  
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treatment regression is the belief that the random shocks which affect a farmer's GM also 
affect whether or not that farmer is using IVs. 
4.3. The switching regression model 
All the above methods assume that every farmer faces the same opportunity cost which is 
not necessarily the case. The more interesting question could be ‘Who pays higher / 
lower opportunity cost?’ ‘Why?’or ‘What factors determine the size of the opportunity 
cost?’ Addressing these questions requires estimating the effect of using improved and 
local seeds on the GM of each specific farmer. Thus, the switching regression model has 
been used for the following compelling reason i.e. the use of improved seeds does not 
have only an intercept effect but also a slope effect. In other words, the coefficients differ 
according to variety use status as well (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973; Quandt, 1988). This 
model allows full set of interactions between variety use status and the x’s. 
Let us consider the usual linear regression problem:  
i i i i e x y + = b                                                                                                                        (2) 
Taking this basic equation, we can split it into two regimes and the GMs generated by the 






i ji j i u X y
1






i ji j i u X y
1
0 0 0 b   (Regime 0 which holds if C = 0)                                                      (4) 
i ji j u Z C + =g
*                                                                                                                     (5)  
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where the errors, u1i and u0i, are assumed to be distributed normally and independently, 
with mean zero and constant variance, s
2. The gj’s  are unknown coefficients to be 
estimated and Zji’s determine in which regime the i
th observation is generated. The Xji’s 
refer to factors described in Table 1. C is the function that determines the regime. The 
size and sign of the GM difference in the two regimes (ᝰ1i - ᝰ0i) is the indicator for the 
magnitude of the opportunity cost. 
5. Data generation and description 
5.1. The data generation process 
To generate the data, the study has adopted a multi-stage stratified sampling technique. 
Three agro-ecologically contrasting and neighboring zones in Eastern Ethiopia (East 
Hararghe, West Hararghe and Dire Dawa) were considered. From each zone, the Districts 
were ranked based on the relative importance of sorghum and three Districts were 
considered in each Zone. From each District, 2-3 peasant associations (PAs) were 
selected based on their agro-ecological representative-ness and importance of the crop. A 
total of 198 farmers were randomly sampled of whom the heads of 185 of them were 
male.  The survey was undertaken from July 2001 to April 2002 using a structured 
questionnaire.  
To study the effect of prices on the opportunity cost, input and output price indices are 
computed. Output price index is computed as the ratio of the price of output that the i
th 
household faces to the overall average price. To construct the input price index, for n 
inputs used in producing sorghum, the weighted input price index is computed in two 
steps. First the individual input price indices (Yij ) are computed for each household using 
the same procedure as the output price case. Following that, the ratios of the i
th input cost  
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to total cost (hij)  are computed for each household to be used as weights in the 
computation. For each household, the ratio tells the contribution of the i
th input in the 
total cost structure of the household to produce sorghum. Thus, the input price indices 







h y k where j indexes inputs and i indexes households. 
5.2. Data description 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used later in the regression.  
HERE TABLE 1 
The variables which significantly distinguish UIVs from UFVs are number of visits by 
the extension agent, package participation, experience in growing IVs, fertilizer use, plot 
quality, and gross margin per hectare. 
6. Results and discussion 
6.1. Magnitude of opportunity costs computed 
Table  2 shows the average opportunity costs generated from different homogeneous 
treatment statistical procedures discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
HERE TABLE 2 
Depending on the method of analysis used, average opportunity cost ranges from 168 to 
659 Birr/Ha. From these results and assuming 100 landraces for each crop with three 
replications of 1 hectare each, compensation cost for on-farm conservation of traditional 
sorghum  varieties  ranges from 50,460 Birr (» €5,046
6)  to 197,760 Birr (» €19,776). In 
                                                   
6 During the time of data collection (2002), 1Euro (€) was about 10 Birr.  
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other words, maintaining one landrace of sorghum would cost about 504 Birr (» € 51) to 
1,978 Birr (» € about 198) annually. This kind of information on costs of conservation 
has far reaching role to get idea on the financial requirement, generate the deficit from 
international sources, optimize costs, allocate resources among alternative conservation 
methods, allocate resources among the various genetic resources, set conservation 
priority, and set fees for users of genetic resources. 
The above cost estimation is very small compared to the annual sorghum production of 
over 12 million quintals per annum (NSIA, 2001). If their plots have to be used for on-
farm conservation purpose, the amount of compensation that sorghum farmers can expect 
is 803.76 Birr /Ha (the average GM per hectare earned from the improved seeds). 
6.2. Factors influencing magnitude of opportunity costs  
In general, the mean GM/Ha of UIVs is greater than the mean GM/Ha of UFVs. 
However, computing the opportunity costs for each household using the procedures 
above reveals that there are UFVs who have earned a GM greater than the average of the 
UIVs and the opportunity costs vary across farmers. Table 3 reports full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates of a switching regression model run to explain 
this variation. 
HERE TABLE 3 
According to the results above, opportunity costs increase with access to market and 
extension, number of visits by the extension agent, participation in the extension package, 
fertilizer use, and experience in growing improved seeds. On the contrary, opportunity 
costs decrease with rainfall distribution, land quality, education level of the household  
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head, input price, oxen ownership, sorghum price, and cash crop farming (cht’at – Catha 
Edulis)
7. Cash crop farming reduces the opportunity cost because farmers growing cht’at 
are typically better-off and sorghum is relatively less important to them. 
The effect of plot quality on the opportunity cost is negative implying that better quality 
plots can reduce the GM difference and make the local seeds more advantageous. Unlike 
frequent claims, the local seeds are more advantageous with better quality plots than the 
improved ones implying that the local seeds have even a better comparative advantage 
with good quality plots. The negative impact of input prices on GM is more pronounced 
for farmers growing improved seeds reflecting the capital intensity of their production. 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
The motivation for calculating and analyzing opportunity costs is that farmers’ 
bargaining power and the level of compensation for  contextual on-farm conservation 
schemes  is a function of opportunity costs. To  this end, the government can design 
conservation schemes in such a way that identified farmers maintain local varieties and 
the government compensates their opportunity costs. 
Having estimated the opportunity costs, the paper has shown that household level on-
farm compensation costs can be used to estimate national level on-farm conservation 
costs. The comparison of the costs with the importance of the crop, the use value of 
CGRs to breeding (crop productivity improvement and pharmaceutical industries), and 
their contribution to yield stability and crop insurance justify the compensation costs. 
                                                   
7 This is an important stimulant cash crop in the study area. Consumers chew the leaves.  
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The  regression results have shown that access to market and extension, marketing 
surplus, participation in the extension package, farmers’ experience with the package, 
fertilizer use, and experience in growing improved seeds are the most important factors 
increasing opportunity costs. On the contrary, land quality, input prices, education level 
of the household head, rainfall suitability, output prices, and oxen ownership decrease 
opportunity costs. 
The results suggest that farm households found in localities where factors increasing 
opportunity costs prevail will have to get better compensation. Moreover, compensations 
should, in principle, be flexible depending on the variability of opportunity costs 
temporally and spatially. Differentiated compensation is cost-effective and in line with 
farmers’ expectations. 
Since the opportunity costs are functions of agricultural development, as agriculture 
becomes more productive and commercialized, the level of compensation will increase. 
Cash crops and high value crops call for higher compensation. Accordingly, in a farming 
system where high value cash crops (like cht’at) prevail, it will be more expensive to 
maintain local varieties of food crops like sorghum. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression 
Variable  Description  Mean (SD) 















Visits  Number of visits by the extension 
agent during the last cropping 
season 
2.98 (3.1)  1.27 (2.8)  + 
Access2  The average time required to reach 
(on foot) the extension agent, dry 
weather road, and local market 
(Minutes) 





1 if the household is taking part in 
the package during the survey year 
0.62 (0.5)  0.26 (0.4)  +  
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and 0 other wise  
Impexep  Experience in growing IVs (years)  3.5 (2.1)  1.27 (1.5)  + 
Educate1  Education level of the HH head  1.27 (2.2)  1.48 (1.9)  + 
Chat1  0 – no cht’at at all; 1 – only for 
own consumption; 2 – also for 
village sales; 3 – also for sales in 
the cities 
1.33 (1.2)  1.26 (1.1)  + 





Rainfall  Rainfall distribution (3 – bad, 2- 
medium, 1-good) during the 
survey year 
2.21 (0.7)  2.30 (0.6)  + 
Oxen  Number of oxen owned by the 
household during the survey year 
0.86 (0.9)  0.69 (0.8)  + 
Inputindex  Input price index  0.99 (0.2)  1.01 (0.3)  ? 
Allquality1  Plot quality index (3 – good, 2- 
medium, 1-bad) 
1.22 (0.8)  0.86 (0.7)  ? 
Sorgindx  Sorghum price index  1.03 (0.4)  0.97 (0.3)  + 
Source: 2001/2002 own survey  
Notes: For users of both varieties, the GM is referring to UIVs. NI = not important. 
Table 2: Average opportunity costs of growing indigenous varieties of sorghum 
Method  Opportunity costs in Birr /Ha 
Simple OLS
a  168.2 
Matching  433.8 
IV regression  537.7 
Treatment regression  659.2 
Source: See table 1. 
aIn this case, variety use is considered as an exogenous variable.  
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Table 3: FIML estimates of a switching regression model 
Variable  Coefficient  Variable  Coefficient 
Regime 1 – Users of IVs  Regime 0 – Users of FVs 
Constant  696.7 (1.7)  Constant  1412.6 (3.0) 
ACCESS2  -6.4
** (-2.3)  ACCESS2  -1.1 (-0.34) 
CHAT1  72.9 (1.1)  CHAT1  94.3 (1.4) 
RAINFALL  -189.6
* (-1.8)  RAINFALL  -266.6
*** (-2.7) 
EDUCATE1  9.4 (0.25)  EDUCATE1  18.1 (0.51) 
ALLQUALI  -91.1 (-0.88)  ALLQUALI  -351.3
*** (-3.4) 
INPUTIND  -919.5
*** (-3.0)  INPUTIND  -684.3
* (-1.9) 
ALLFERT  0.24 (0.93)  ALLFERT  -0.23 (-0.74) 
VISITS  51.0
** (2.3)   
IMPEXEP  266.5
*** (7.3)   
PACKAGE  342.2
** (2.1)   
OXEN  79.4 (1.0)  OXEN  195.3
** (2.3) 
SORGINDX  598.4
*** (3.2)  SORGINDX  644.8
*** (3.1) 
Sigma(1)  603.3 (13.0)  Sigma(0)  678.7 (10.9) 
Dependent variable               GMM             Number of observations              175     
Log likelihood function       -1440.82                      
Source: See Table 1 
Notes: 
***, **, and
 * refer to significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in 
parentheses are the ratio of the coefficient to the estimated asymptotic 
standard error. 